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A Crucifix Belongs in the Italian Classroom
It will be argued that because the crucifix is such a crucial part of the Italian culture, and the requirement in Italian law that crucifixes be displayed in classrooms of state schools does not contravene any human rights laws, the crucifix can indeed be said to belong in the Italian classroom.
The crucifix is, of course, originally a religious symbol; it is a representation of a cross with a figure of Christ on it. Mussolini introduced the law mandating the display of crucifixes in Italian classrooms at a time when Roman Catholicism was the single religion of the State (Neville). The Catholic Church ceased to be the State Church in 1984. So why are crucifixes still proudly displayed in schools all around the country? The state does not need to have Catholicism as its official religion for crucifixes to be a prominent part of Italian life. In Italy, the crucifix is not considered to be an exclusively religious symbol; it holds a much deeper significance to many Italians. It is a huge part of their culture, just as much as excessive gesticulation, leisurely lunches and the world-famous cuisine are.
Geertz wrote that culture is semiotic: 'man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore … an interpretive one in search of meaning.' His definition highlights the ever-changing nature of culture; it depends on people attaching meaning to things, making them symbols. The symbol given meaning in this situation is the crucifix. The meaning originally prescribed to the crucifix was that Jesus died for our sins. As time went on, the crucifix gained historical and cultural meanings too; it became 'a symbol of unity and welcoming for all of humanity...' (Hooper). It is a sign of national identity, just as much as it is a sign of Christianity.
It is important to respect culture; therefore the Italian tradition of displaying crucifixes in schools should be respected. Having said this, Member States party to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) have 'a duty to uphold confessional neutrality in public education' (Lautsi v Italy). Does the displaying of crucifixes go against this principle? This very issue was discussed in Lautsi v Italy, a case brought forward by a Finnish-Italian woman who wished to have crucifixes removed from the school her two children attended. She argued that the presence of these crucifixes 'constituted interference incompatible with the freedom of belief and religion and with the right to education and teaching in conformity with her religious and philosophical convictions.'
The Italian courts decided against Mrs Lautsi. As part of it’s reasoning, the Administrative Court said 'that the crucifix was a historical and cultural symbol, possessing an “identity-linked value” for the Italian people...' (Human Rights Europe). The Consiglio di Stato confirmed 'that the presence of crucifixes in State-school classrooms … was compatible with the principle of secularism.' The court even went as far as to say that 'the crucifix in classrooms could fulfil, in a “secular” perspective, a highly educational function' because it taught 'tolerance, affirmation of one’s rights, the autonomy of one’s moral conscience vis-à-vis authority, human solidarity and the refusal of any form of discrimination.'
The case was then referred to the European Court of Human Rights. Previously, 'the court had always considered that states are free in this area, that it is necessary to respect their culture and tradition, and that the only limitation that cannot be surmounted is that of subjecting pupils to indoctrination or an abusive proselytism' (Colina).
Surprisingly then, in this instance the Chamber held the requirement to be in violation of Article 9 of the ECHR (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (the right to education). It held that the ‘negative’ freedom of religion (i.e. freedom from interference by other people) is not limited to the absence of religious services and religious education, it is extended to practices, symbols and beliefs. That State in particular must ensure that it does not impinge on this freedom, especially in respect of vulnerable persons, such as children who lack 'the critical capacity which would enable them to keep their distance from the message derived from a preference manifested by the State in religious matters.' In order to ensure that this right is protected, the 'State has a duty to uphold confessional neutrality in public education…' In the Chamber’s view, by mandating public schools to display crucifixes, the State expressed a belief that dissenters had to make disproportionate sacrifices to avoid and so there was a violation.
This decision was faced with huge amounts of criticism. Not only was the judgment criticised on legal grounds - because the Court failed to include the legal basis and margin of appreciation tests in its reasoning - but there was also religious and political uproar at this decision. For example, Raimondo Soragni, mayor of a small town in the north of Italy said he wanted to defy the Chambers ruling, stating that '[t]he crucifix doesn't harm anyone's dignity. It is one of the cultural references of our nation.' The ripples of this outrage even reached the Vatican, which labelled the ruling 'short-sighted' and 'ideological.' People clearly felt strongly that crucifixes are part of the Italian culture and that this was an issue for Italians, not the ECtHR, to deal with.
The case soon became 'a symbol of the … conflict [between] promoters of the total secularization of society and those who defend a Europe' that at least somewhat retains its religious identity' (Colina). There are arguments that secularization is necessary to fully uphold religious pluralism and thus displaying a religious symbol in State schools is to the detriment of religious pluralism. The concern is that people from minority religions or atheists would feel marginalized or even threatened by the presence of symbols belonging to the majority religion in public spaces. However, the Chamber’s ruling did not cause a divide between Catholics and non-Catholics in Italy over the issue: on the contrary, what emerged was a 'single strong coalition against the European court's ruling' (Mesco). The majority of Italian people put their religious differences aside and stood in disagreement with the Chamber, as they acknowledged the cultural significance of the crucifix.
The Italian government then lodged an appeal to the Grand Chamber of the Court. Not only was this supported by the people of Italy themselves, but also by 20 countries, who submitted amicus curiae briefs, 'extraordinary testimonies of the defense of their patrimony and identity in face of the imposition of a sole cultural model' (Colina). The Grand Chamber held that there was no violation. It explained that the minimum level that states have to meet is not to indoctrinate people. Although the fact that the cross was a symbol of the state’s majority religion was not alone sufficient to mean there was no violation, the fact that the cross was shown to be a passive symbol with no influence on pupils was. Children could still hold and manifest other views. Therefore, the displaying of the crucifixes was indeed in line with secularism and not damaging to religious pluralism. Also influential to the decision was the Italian government’s argument that, 'beyond its religious meaning, the crucifix symbolized the principles and values which formed the foundation of democracy and western civilization, and…its presence in classrooms was justifiable on that account.' It is what the crucifix represents beyond religious sentiment that is key to its place in the Italian classroom. Consequently, it was held that 'the decision whether or not to perpetuate [this] tradition falls in principle within the margin of appreciation of the respondent State.' In other words, they held that there was up to the domestic authorities to decide whether or not to continue mandating the display of crucifixes in classrooms. The public, from politicians to religions leaders, welcomed this decision. Franco Frattini praised the decision as it defended 'the rights of citizens to defend their own values and their own identities', while the Vatican called it 'an important and historic ruling.'
Clearly, context is important. Not all religious symbols are allowed to be publicly displayed at all times in all European countries. For example, in Leyla Sahin v Turkey the ECtHR held that a university’s prohibition of students wearing Islamic headscarves or beards did not violate Article 9 or Article 14 (the prohibition of discrimination) of the ECHR. One of the legitimate aims that justified this restriction was public order. As the Grand Chamber pointed out in Lautsi, the crucifix is a passive symbol in Italy and was not seen as threatening, unlike the Islamic headscarf or beard in Turkey, which were linked to concerns about 'the fact that there are extremist political movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols…'
While displaying religious symbols in public spaces may not be appropriate in some circumstances in some countries, evidently there is no problem in displaying crucifixes in Italian classrooms. The ECtHR ruling in Lautsi tells us that this practice does not violate any human rights laws, so crucifixes are allowed in Italian classrooms, but do they belong there? The answer to this question lies in the cultural significance of the crucifix to Italians. Popular sentiment must be taken into account in decisions like this. Therefore, as the Italians feel that the crucifix belongs in the classroom for historical and cultural reasons, then it must rightly remain there.